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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Between living parties, if an Intent to transfer an interest in the
money deposited is proven, or if the presumption of shift of title raised
by statute is not rebutted, a presumption that each named depositor owns
one-half of the account arises. In re Farmers' & Merchants' Bank of
Grand Rapids, 221 Mich. 243, 190 N. W. 698 (1922); Moskowitz v. Marrow,
supra; Tomkins v. McGinn, supra.
Does one depositor have the right to pursue the amounts withdrawn
by the other, and demand an accounting? The California court in the
instant case makes this statement, "Contrary to the canon of the common
law, our courts have established the rule that, when money is taken from
a joint tenancy during the joint lives of the depositors, property acquired
by the money so withdrawn, or another account into which the money
is traced, will retain its character as property held in joint tenancy,
unless a change in the character has been effected by some agreement
between the parties." The rule thus stated is supported by a line of California cases beginning with In re Harris' Estate, 169 Cal. 725, 147 Pac.
967 (1915). The effect of the rule is to require restoration to any joint
tenancy account unless you can find consent to the withdrawals. This is
admittedly contrary to the common law, in ,which the first consideration
is whether a true joint tenancy exists or not, according to the elements
or statutes discussed earlier in this note. If a joint tenancy does exist,
either party may withdraw a moiety or less without the other's consent.
In re Sutter's Estate, 138 Misc. Rep. 85, 245 N. Y. S. 636 (1930); In re
Porianda's Estate, 135 Misc. Rep. 389, 237 N. Y. S. 715 (1929).
The
amounts thus withdrawn are severed from the joint tenancy and become
the private property of the withdrawer. See note 77 A. L. R. 799. If a
true joint tenancy is not created due to a lack of some element, the right
to demand an accounting for the whole fund still exists in the depositor.
Bruner v. Bruner, 223 App. Div. 186, 228 N. Y. S. 63 (1928).
Also, if
more than a moiety is withdrawn, the courts consider an attempt has
been made to destroy the joint tenancy, rather than to make a severance,
and they then require an accounting for the whole fund. O'Connor v.
Dunnigan, 158 App. Div. 334, 143 N. Y. S. 373 (1913); In re Sutter's
Estate, supra. It is submitted that the California court need not state
the rule so broadly, as the common law rules would have procured the
desired result in most instances. The instant case could have reached
the same result by applying the rule of the O'Connor case.
A. T. W.

BOOK REVIEW
THE MIND OF THE JUROR. By ALBERT S. OSBURN.
Albany: The Boyd Printing Company. Pp. 239.

1937.

Provocative, but wholesomely so, is this penetrating and ably
written commentary (of moderate length) on the present state of
the administration of justice in the United States. One almost
hesitates to denominate the author a layman, because his qualifications as one of the foremost document specialists of all time have
taken him, during a period of over forty years, into the courts of
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forty-three states and into nearly every province of Canada. So,
as Dean Wigmore observes in the introduction to the volume, he
ig a very wise layman. At the same time, our author enjoys a
position of detachment and can view the functioning of our courts
with an objectivity perhaps difficult of attainment by the equally
well informed advocate.
The volume begins and ends with a vigorous criticism of many
features of American procedural law. Sandwiched in, so to speak,
are some choice chapters on the effect of prejudice in jury trials,
"Human Nature and the Law," "Psychology in the Courtroom,"
"Tactful Tactics," and the function of the trial lawyer in assembling and presenting the evidehee, in cross-examining witnesses,
and in summing up. Of these subjects the author's observations
are discerning and should be helpful, not only to the tyro, but to
the practitioner of experience as well. It is to be doubted whether
the advantages of courtesy, tact, and fairness in the courtroom,
the purpose and utility of cross-examination, the necessity for the
exercise of care and intelligence in planning a successful crossexamination, and the value of restraint and candor in argument
have ever been better illustrated and expounded. Nowhere, I
think, is more forcibly emphasized the desirability of simple and
concise presentation. His own discussion of the psychological influences at work in the courtroom is illustrative of desirably
direct and understandable exposition of an elusive and intangible
subject.
"A tangled group of long unusual words," he says, "does not
necessarily represent an intelligent grasp of this subject or any
subject and one is not qualified to tell fortunes or cure diseases
merely because he has learned to speak the much overworked word
'complex.' He may 'evaluate' a thing and still be stupid."
In saying the book is provocative, I have reference to Mr. Osburn's pretty severe castigation of the status quo of our procedural
rules. In this connection it should be noted that he does not let
us forget the often unfortunate results of the adversary nature of
the trial of a common law action-the "contentious trial''-and
many of the defects he sees in present procedure are due, he thinks,
to an "uncontrolled spirit of advocacy." The remedy, he believes,
lies largely in the restoration to the trial judge of the right to assist
the jury in interpreting and weighing the evidence, though he
recognizes that the propriety of such action may depend upon
antecedent reforms respecting the manner of selection, the tenure,
and the compensation of the judge.
Mr. Osburn assumes rather dogmatically that, in the average
civil or criminal trial, all the right is on one side and all the wrong
on the other, that counsel for the one side is a paragon of virtue
and the other (whom he calls the "lawyer against the facts"), if
not a little diabolical, is likely something of a pettifogger, and also
that the rules of evidence ("those musty old rules" from "dusty
old law books") have their principal utility in assisting the "lawyer against the facts" in preventing the jury from hearing the
truth. We fear Mr. Osburn has overlooked a fact which will be
verified by every lawyer of experience, namely, (using Wigmore's
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phrasing) "that in a great part of civil litigation, it does not
happen that all the acts and facts on one side have been wholly
right and lawful and all of those on the other wholly wrong and
unlawful. There is more commonly a mixture of these qualities in
infinitely varying proportions." And even in criminal cases, "the
element of wrong is not always found separated from an element
of right"-that is to say, it is not always true that -a legally guilty
criminal defendant is "wholly and indivisibly guilty."
Tolstoi
has expressed a related idea very well: "One of the most widespread superstitions is that every man has his own special, definite
qualities; that -a man is kind, cruel, wise, stupid, energetic, apathetic, etc. Men are not like that. We may say of a man that he
is more often kind than cruel, oftener wise than stupid, oftener
energetic than apathetic, or the reverse; but it would be false to
say of one man that he is kind and wise, of -another that he is wicked
and foolish. Every man carries in himself the germs of every
human quality, and sometimes one manifests itself, sometimes another, and the man often becomes unlike himself while still remaining the same man."
In the trial of the average case, the problem is to determine
where the preponderance of right lies. The denomination, either
before or after this determination, of the counsel on either side as
the "lawyer against the facts" is of very questionable validity.
And while we can all agree that there is much room for improvement in respect to the rules of evidence, we should hardly be
justified in condemning all the rules of relevancy and all the
exclusionary rules as archaic and moth-ridden. Theoretically, at
least, most of these rules, such as the hearsay rule, are designed to
insure the trustworthiness of evidence and thus assist the jury in
arriving at a correct and just result. The fact that these rules
may have, in practice, broken down here and there scarcely justifies such a comprehensive condemnation.
Yet it must be confessed that the views of such an experienced
and well informed lay observer are challenging -and should prompt
the bar to take a more general interest in the improvement and
revision of trial procedure. It is probably true that the author,
recognizing the apathy, lethargy, conservatism, or what you will,
of the bar generally toward improvement in matters of this kind,
chose somewhat deliberately to be provocative and a little annoying
in his castigation. He says as much: "Those who see the shortcomings are in duty bound to awaken and even annoy their companions. It may not be possible to do this gently. Violent and
radical criticisms and even epithets are sometimes fully justified
and books that say these things in a disagreeable way should not
at once be condemned without careful consideration."
If Mr.
Osburn's poignant criticism of present trial practice, the application of the rules of evidence, and current methods of selecting
juries seems a little violent and exaggerated, his commentary,
nevertheless, should perform a valuable function in urging the
profession to improvement before the laity takes matters into its
own hands.
JUDsoN F. FALKNOR.
University of Washington Law School.

